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v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is based on this Courts grant of Defendants' Petition for Permission to 
Appeal an Interlocutory Order under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) on August 
20, 2008. (R. 1490) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do the non-party medical records which St. Marks Hospital was ordered to 
produce fall under the exception to the physician-patient privilege set forth in Utah Rule 
of Evidence 506(d), because the condition of the non-party patients is an element of the 
parties' claims and defenses? 
2. Does the physician-patient privilege apply to medical records in which all 
information which could identify the patient has been redacted? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because the trial court ruled on a question of law, the ruling should by reviewed 
for correctness. Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Ctr., 121 P.3d 74, 76 (Utah App. 
2005). 
RELEVANT RULES 
Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. An annotated copy of Rule 506 is 
included in the addendum attached to this brief. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Nature of Plaintiff s Claims Against St. Marks 
1. This is a medical malpractice case against St. Marks Hospital. 
2. Christopher Jolles, M.D. was also named as a defendant, but the claims against Dr. 
Jolles were settled and dismissed. However, St. Marks intends to include Dr. 
Jolles on the special verdict form and argue to the jury that fault should be 
apportioned to Dr. Jolles for plaintiffs injuries. (R. 22) 
3. Plaintiff underwent hysterectomy surgery at St. Marks on April 10, 2003. Plaintiff 
suffered permanent kidney damage as a result of complications following the 
surgery. 
4. Plaintiff asserts that following her surgery, the staff at St. Marks was negligent for 
failing to properly monitor her vital signs, and failing to take action in response to 
significant changes in plaintiffs vital signs. (R. 708) 
5. For example, in the eight hour period between 6:15 pm on April 10th, and 2:00 am 
on April 11th, plaintiffs blood pressure dropped from 132/82 to 86/52. (R. 284) 
6. In addition, plaintiffs urine output was less than 20 cc's per hour throughout the 
early morning of April 11th. (R. 284) 
7. St. Mark's nurses were trained to call a doctor if a patient's systolic (top number) 
pressure dropped below 90. (R. 287) 
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8. Plaintiffs treating physician had ordered that he be notified if plaintiff s urine 
output dropped below 20 cc's per hour. 
9. Plaintiff contends that the registered nurse assigned to care for plaintiff, Angela 
Stallings, failed to notify plaintiffs doctor or take other action to treat the decrease 
in plaintiffs blood pressure and low urine output. (R. 708) 
10. St. Mark's nurses were trained to recheck a patient's blood pressure every hour 
where there was a decrease in pressure like there was in this case. (R. 290-91) 
11. Despite the significant drop in plaintiffs blood pressure, St. Mark's staff only 
checked plaintiffs blood pressure once in the eight hour period from 2:00 am until 
10:00 am. (R. 284) 
12. Plaintiffs kidney damage was caused by her drop in blood pressure and could 
have been prevented if the low blood pressure had been treated. (R. 588-90) 
13. Plaintiff asserts that her drop in blood pressure went untreated because the nurse 
assigned to plaintiff, Angela Stallings, was assigned more patients than she could 
reasonably care for during the shift in question and was too busy with other 
patients to properly monitor and care for plaintiff. (R. 708-09) 
14. Plaintiff was granted leave to seek punitive damages from St. Marks on the 
grounds that St. Marks was knowingly understaffed with nurses and lacked 
adequate personnel to provide safe and competent care to plaintiff and other 
patients. (R. 708-09) 
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The Evidence of Understaffing on the Night in Question 
15. The 4 West floor where plaintiff was a patient at St. Marks had 34 patients on the 
night in question. (R. 1028) 
16. St. Mark's staffing guidelines required the 4 West floor to have six registered 
nurses on staff if there were 34 patients. (R. 1030) 
17. There were only five registered nurses working on 4 West on the night in question 
rather than the required six registered nurses.1 (R. 1028, 1039, 1045,) 
18. A ratio of six nurses for 34 patients means that each nurse should have either five 
or six patients. The Nursing Supervisor for 4 West testified that no nurse should 
have more than six patients. (R. 1037) 
19. The nurse assigned to plaintiff, Angela Stailings, was assigned seven patients on 
the shift in question. (R. 1034, 1039) 
20. Working as a nurse on 4 West was Angela Stailings' first nursing experience since 
graduating from nursing school. She had only been working as a nurse for 
approximately 90 days on the night she was caring for plaintiff. (R. 1041-42) 
*St. Mark's assertion that there were six nurses on 4 West on the night in question 
includes a trainee whom St. Marks did not count as a nurse in its own staffing documents. 
(R. 1028, 1039, 1045) St. Mark's Nursing Supervisor Report states that there were only 
five registered nurses on 4West after 11:00 p.m. (R. 1028) The sixth nurse listed on the 
staffing assignment sheet, Nancy Emero, went home at 11:00 pm on the night in question, 
and her patients were reassigned to the five remaining nurses. (R.1039, 1044-45) 
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21. The Nursing Supervisor for 4 West testified that the newer nurses on 4 West 
should be given a lighter patient load. Despite being a new nurse, Angela Stallings 
was assigned seven patients, rather than the maximum of six patients. (R. 1032) 
22. The Certified Nurse Assistant (CNA) who cared for plaintiff at St. Marks during 
the period when plaintiff suffered kidney damage due to the drop in blood 
pressure, testified as follows: 
A. Because of the heavy patient load on the 4 West floor where plaintiff 
was a patient, the CNA's did not have time to chart patient vital 
signs. (R. 302) 
B. Because of the heavy patient load, the CNA's would inaccurately 
chart vital signs as being taken as much as one and a half hours 
later than the patient's vitals were actually checked. (R.303-04) 
C. The CNA felt the heavy patient load was "hard to handle" and put 
her in "stressful" situations. (R.303-04) 
D. The Registered Nurses on the 4 West floor also had patient loads 
which were too high and were stressful for them. (R.305) 
E. The CNA complained to St. Marks' management about the heavy 
patient load. (R.304-06) 
F. The high patient load was talked about "regularly" at St. Marks, and 
was discussed during "in-service" meetings. (R.305-07) 
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G. St. Marks' response to the complaints that there were not enough 
nurses to handle the high patient loads was that the hospital was not 
willing to spend the money needed to have more nurses on the 
floor. (R.307-08) 
The Relevance of the Non-Party Medical Records 
23. Patient "acuity" refers to an evaluation of how much nursing care a particular 
patient will require. (R.314) 
24. The supervisor responsible for staffing nurses on the 4 West floor testified that it is 
not possible to evaluate whether 4 West was understaffed with nurses without 
documentation concerning patient acuity. (R.315-16) 
25. St. Mark's retained nursing expert testified that it was not possible to evaluate 
whether the assignment of seven patients to Angela Stallings was an appropriate 
patient load without evidence concerning the condition or acuity of each patient 
she was assigned on the night in question. (Attached as Exhibit K to Plaintiffs 
Answer in Opposition to St. Mark's Hospital's Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order) 
26. St. Marks did not retain documentation concerning the acuity of the patients 
assigned to Nurse Stallings on the subject shift. Thus, the medical records on the 
patients assigned to Nurse Stallings are the only information available concerning 
patient acuity. (R.1050-51) 
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27. The manager for the 4 West floor identified a variety of factors which increase the 
acuity of a patient which could be determined from the medical records on the 
patients assigned to Nurse Stallings. (R. 1053-36) 
28. Plaintiff moved to compel St. Marks to produce documents reflecting the acuity of 
the patients assigned to Nurse Stallings on the night in question. St. Marks was 
ordered to produce either (1) a chart reflecting the acuity of Nurse Stallings' 
patients, or (2) a statement discussing how patient acuity was assessed and 
communicated between the staff on the 4 West floor. (R. 1217) 
29. In response to the trial court's order, St. Marks produced the Affidavit of How-Su 
Chen, the nursing manager for the 4 West floor. Ms. Chen testified in her affidavit 
that she could not provide a chart summarizing the acuity of Nurse Stallings' 
patients. However, she also testified that based on her review of the medical 
records on each of Nurse Stallings' patients, the assignment of those seven 
patients to Angela Stallings on the night in question was an appropriate 
patient load. (R.1056, 1217-18) 
30. The trial court never ordered St. Marks to review the non-party patients' medical 
records and provide opinion testimony concerning whether or not Angela Stallings 
was assigned too many patients. (R.689-703,1218) 
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The Staffing Documents Produced by St. Marks 
31. St. Marks has produced a total of two pages which reflect staffing on the night in 
question. (R.1028, 1039) The documents produced by St. Mark's simply show the 
number of patients and the nurses to whom they were assigned. The documents 
produced by St. Mark contain no information concerning the condition or acuity of 
the patients assigned to Angela Stallings on the night in question. St. Mark's 
nursing expert readily admitted that it is not possible to evaluate whether Angela 
Stallings' patient load on the night in question was too heavy without information 
concerning the condition of each of her patients. (Attached as Exhibit K to 
Plaintiffs Answer in Opposition to St. Mark's Hospital's Petition for Permission 
to Appeal Interlocutory Order) 
32. Medical records on the six other patients assigned to Angela Stallings are the only 
existing evidence concerning the acuity of these patients that would allow for an 
analysis of whether the staffing was appropriate. (R. 1050-51) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the trial court's order because the plain language of 
Utah's physician-patient privilege, as stated in U.R.E. 506, shows that the privilege does 
not apply in any court proceeding in which a patient's medical condition is an element of 
a claim or defense. Utah courts have recognized that any party to a proceeding may place 
a patient's medical condition at issue, i.e., the privilege does not apply even if the patient 
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is not a party to the proceeding in which the patient's condition is at issue. Here, the 
medical conditions contained in the non-party medical records are an element of 
Plaintiffs claims, and St. Marks has used those same conditions as an element of its 
defense. 
Moreover, the "vast majority" of states have found that the privilege does not 
apply when adequate safeguards are used to protect patient confidentiality. The courts 
reason that the need for patient confidentiality must be balanced with the need for 
discovery, and that the privilege must be read as only applying when the medical records 
can be connected to a particular patient. 
The trial court balanced Plaintiffs need for the records with the need for patient 
confidentiality and found that Plaintiffs need outweighed the need for confidentiality. 
The trial court also provided adequate safeguards by ordering all patient-identifying 
information to be redacted and entering a strict protective order (1) limiting review of the 
redacted medical records to attorneys and experts only, para-legals and support staff 
cannot review the records; (2) preventing the records from being disclosed outside of this 
litigation; and (3) requiring the records to be returned at the conclusion of the litigation. 
The requested records are highly relevant to this case. St. Mark's personnel and 
retained expert testified that plaintiffs staffing claims cannot be evaluated without the 
information on the six non-party patients contained in their medical records. St. Marks 
claims that the records are irrelevant because Plaintiffs negligent-staffing claim is 
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unnecessary given plaintiffs respondeat superior claim. This Court, however, has held 
that "regardless" of whether an employer can be held liable on a respondeat-superior 
claim, an employer may be directly liable for its own negligence. Further, Plaintiff seeks 
punitive damages from St. Marks on the grounds that it knowingly and recklessly 
understaffed the hospital, which will require proof of facts separate and distinct from 
those needed to prove St. Mark's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
St. Marks also claims that the records are not needed because they are irrelevant to 
Plaintiffs claims. This is not true. Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Stalling's was negligent in 
her care of plaintiff, and that Nurse Stalling's negligence resulted from St. Marks 
assigning her more patients that she could reasonably be expected to care for 
simultaneously. St. Mark's own personnel and experts readily admitted that the question 
of whether Nurse Stallings was assigned to many patients cannot be evaluated without . 
information concerning the condition of each of her patients, and that the medical records 
on these patients are the only evidence of the patients' conditions. Thus, the medical 
records have independent causal relevance to Plaintiffs claims. 
St. Mark's last argument is that the records are not needed because it has already 
provided Plaintiff with evidence concerning staffing. St. Marks provided Plaintiff a total 
of only two pages concerning the staffing on the night in question, and these documents 
do not contain any information concerning patient acuity which is essential to evaluating 
whether the staffing was appropriate. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
UTAH'S PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY 
IN PROCEEDINGS WHERE, AS HERE, A PATIENT'S MEDICAL 
CONDITION IS AN ELEMENT OF A CLAIM OR DEFENSE. 
The Court should affirm the trial court's order because Utah's physician-patient 
privilege does not apply in any proceeding in which a patient's medical condition is an 
element of a claim or defense. The condition of the six patients cared for by Nurse 
Stallings on the night in question is an element of both plaintiffs understaffmg claim and 
St. Mark's defense of the claim. Utah courts have recognized that the physician-patient 
privilege does not apply even if the patient whose records are sought is not a party to the 
proceeding and does not put his or her own condition at issue. Thus, the privilege does 
not apply to medical records on the non-party patients whose conditions are an element of 
plaintiffs claim that St. Marks was understaffed with nurses. 
Utah's physician-patient privilege is governed by Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The scope of the privilege, however, is not absolute. Sorensen v. Barbuto, 111 
P.3d 614, 617 (Utah 2008). Indeed, Rule 506 has several exceptions, one of which 
provides that: 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a 
communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or 
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that 
condition is an element of any claim or defense . . . . 
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U.R.E., Rule 506(d)(1). The patients' medical conditions contained in the requested 
medical records2 are an element of the claims and defenses in this court proceeding. 
Thus, the physician-patient privilege does not apply. 
When interpreting Rule 506, this Court must look to the "plain language" of the 
Rule. Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370, 377 (Utah 2006). The plain language of Rule 506 
shows that the physician-patient privilege does not apply when two elements are met: (1) 
there is a proceeding, (2) in which the medical condition of a patient is an element of a 
claim or defense. Both elements are present here. 
This Court has recognized that a "proceeding," as used in Rule 506, includes a 
court proceeding. "Rule 506 undoubtedly allows a [hospital] to disclose confidential 
information as part of a court proceeding . . . ." Sorensen, 111 P.3d at 618 (Utah 2008). 
The medical records here were requested as part of a court proceeding. 
The patients5 medical conditions contained in the requested records are an element 
of Plaintiff s claims. Plaintiff alleges that St. Marks negligently assigned Nurse Stallings 
more patients than she could reasonably care for, and that St. Marks knowingly and 
recklessly understaffed the hospital with nurses. St. Mark's own personnel and retained 
expert testified that whether or not Nurse Stallings was assigned too many patients could 
not be evaluated without evidence concerning the condition or "acuity" of each patient 
2Plaintiff does not dispute St. Mark's argument that medical records contain 
information that is typically covered by the physician-patient privilege. (See Brief of 
Appellant, pgs. 8-9.) Rather, Plaintiff contends that the privilege does not apply here. 
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she was assigned on the night in question.3 Plaintiff requested all documents showing 
patient acuity for Nurse Stallings' patients. St. Marks responded that the medical records 
on each of the patients were the only evidence of the patients' acuity. Thus, the medical 
records on the six non-party patients are not only relevant to plaintiffs claim that St. 
Marks was understaffed, they are essential to demonstrating whether or not Nurse 
Stallings was assigned too many patients. The condition of the non-party patients is 
certainly an element of both plaintiffs claim and St. Mark's defense. 
St. Marks will likely argue that the exception contained in Rule 506(d)(1) only 
applies when the patient places his or her own medical condition at issue. However, the 
plain language of Rule 506(d)(1), the history of the rule, and Utah case law demonstrate 
that the exception applies regardless of whether it is the patient or a third party litigant 
that places the patient's condition at issue. 
There is simply nothing in Rule 506(d)(1) which indicates that the exception only 
applies where the patient places his or her condition at issue. The Rule only requires that 
the patient's condition be "an element of any claim or defense" for the exception to be 
triggered. 
The history of Utah's Rule 506 supports this conclusion as well. Utah's Rule 506 
is modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. (See U.R.E. 506, Advisory 
Committee Note). The "condition at-issue exception" in Uniform Rule 503 only applies 
3Patient acuity refers to the amount of care or monitoring a patient requires. 
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to a medical condition of a patient in a proceeding in which "he relies" on the condition 
as an element of his claim or defense. (Uniform Rules of Evidence 503 (1974)). Thus, 
the "condition at-issue exception" in the uniform rule only applies if the patient puts his 
or her own condition at issue. This Court4 deviated from the uniform rule and adopted 
Rule 506(d)(1) without any language indicating that the "condition at-issue exception" is 
only triggered when the patient puts her condition at issue. The removal of such language 
demonstrates an intent that Rule 506(d)(1) apply regardless of who puts the patient's 
condition at issue. 
Moreover, there are a number of cases in which Utah courts have held or implied 
that the physician-patient privilege does not apply where any party to a proceeding places 
a patient's medical condition at issue. For instance, in Debry v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582 
(Ut. App. 2000), cert den 'd by, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000), the plaintiff argued that the at-
issue exception did not apply because it was her husband that placed her medical 
condition at issue in a different case. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected this argument 
and said, "[the defendant doctor] argues that this exception applies when any party raises 
the mental condition of a patient in a proceeding. Based on a recent Utah Supreme 
Court case, we must agree with [the defendant doctor]." Id. at 586. (Emphasis added.) 
See also State v. Cardall, 982 P.2d 79 (Utah 1999) (defendant put a non-party victim's 
4St. Marks's argument based on the language of the Rule seems to indicate that this 
Court must construe Rule 506 as the Legislature intended. However, it was this Court 
that adopted Rule 506, not the Legislature. See Burns, 133 P.3d at 375. 
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medical condition at issue); and State v. Worthen, 177 P.3d 664 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008), cert, 
granted by, 189 P.3d 1276 (Utah 2008) (same). Therefore, Utah law is clear that the 
physician-patient privilege does not apply where any party to a proceeding places a 
patient's medical condition at issue. 
Moreover, St. Marks placed the condition of the six non-party patients at issue by 
producing the affidavit testimony of How-Su Chen that Nurse Stallings' patient load was 
appropriate based on her review of the non-party patients' medical records. Courts 
from other states have found that the at-issue exception applies when the defendant places 
a non-party patient's medical condition at issue. For example, in In re Whiteley, 79 
S.W.3d 729 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002), the plaintiff sued the defendant for malpractice arising 
from a knee surgery. The defendant relied on his past success with knee surgeries as a 
defense in the case, and the plaintiff moved to compel redacted medical records for 
several hundred of the defendant's prior knee-surgery patients. The appellate court 
applied the Texas version of Rule 506, which is similar to Utah's, and found that the at-
issue exception applied: 
We conclude the court abused its discretion when it did not apply the 
exception to the physician-patient privilege and denied Whiteley's motion 
to compel production of redacted non-party medical records of Dr. Wright's 
patients on whom he used the Cave-Rowe procedure. 
Id. at 734. 
Similarly, here, St. Marks has placed the non-party patients' medical condition at 
issue. Plaintiff previously filed a motion to compel all documents showing patient acuity. 
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In an attempt to avoid disclosure of the medical records, the trial court ordered St. Marks 
to review the medical records and produce a chart with data related to patient acuity. If 
St. Marks could not provide such a chart, St. Marks was ordered to produce a statement 
discussing how patient acuity is assessed and communicated on 4 West. St. Marks took 
this second option and produced the affidavit of How-Su Chen, in which she claimed that 
she could not assess acuity based on a review of the medical records. 
However, even though she claimed that she could not assess acuity based on a 
review of the medical records, St. Marks went well beyond the Court's order and 
voluntarily used the non-party patients' medical conditions as a defense: 
I have also reviewed the charts of the patients assigned to Angela Stallings 
on the night shift of April 10-11. While it is impossible to recreate the 
specific factors that would have led to the assignment of Ms. Stallings to 
those specific patients, the condition of those patients was consistent 
with the expected patients on 4W. Their assignment to Ms. Stallings 
was an appropriate staffing level for a medical/surgical unit. 
(R.1056) (Emphasis added.) Consequently, like the defendant in Whiteley, St. Marks has 
used non-party patients' medical conditions as an element of its defense. 
Plaintiff must also be given the opportunity to review the same evidence used by 
St. Marks to support the opinion that it was appropriate to assign seven patients to Nurse 
Stallings. The requested medical records are relevant to cross-examination and 
impeachment of Ms. Chen. The trial court was correct in not permitting St. Mark's 
witness to testify that staffing was appropriate based on the condition of Nurse Stallings' 
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patients without allowing Plaintiff to examine records which will show the condition of 
those patients. 
Moreover, St. Marks has failed to come forward with any explanation as to why 
the at-issue exception does not apply. Instead, St. Marks simply concluded, "None of the 
enumerated statutory exceptions apply here to permit the discovery of redacted medical 
records. Utah R. Evid. 506 (d)(1), (2), or (3)." {See Brief of Appellant, pgs. 10-12.) St. 
Marks did not even discuss the at-issue exception. Accordingly, the Court should reject 
St. Marks's argument and find that Rule 506 allows disclosure because the at-issue 
exception applies here. 
II. 
THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY 
WHEN ALL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION 
IS REDACTED. 
The Court should also affirm the trial court's order because the physician-patient 
privilege does not apply when all identifying information is redacted from the medical 
records. "The vast majority of states that have addressed this issue have held that non-
party patient records are discoverable and do not violate the physician-patient privilege 
where there are adequate safeguards to protect the identity of the non-party patient." 
Bennett v. Fieser, 152 F.R.D. 641, 642 (D. Kan. 1994). Here, the trial court went to great 
lengths to provide adequate safeguards to protect the identities of the non-party patients. 
Therefore, the physician-patient privilege does not apply. 
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In In re: Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 178 F.Supp.2d 412 (S.D. N.Y. 
2001), the court recognized that almost every court to consider this issue has ruled in 
favor of discovery and ordered production of the redacted medical records. The doctors 
in Rezulin moved to quash subpoenas for the medical records of patients who participated 
in a study of the drug Rezulin. The doctors argued that the physician-patient privilege 
prohibited the disclosure. The court rejected this argument and reasoned: 
The purposes of the physician-patient privilege in Texas are no different 
than anywhere else. As the Texas Supreme Court has made clear, they are 
to promote candid and complete communication between doctor and patient 
in furtherance of competent medical care and to maintain privacy by 
preventing the disclosure of highly personal information. Once the 
information cannot be connected with the patient, the risk of 
embarrassment that might lead a patient to withhold information from 
a physician and thus interfere with proper treatment, as well as the 
risk of any invasion of personal privacy, is eliminated. Hence, both the 
rule and the statute more reasonably are read as extending the 
privilege to records relating to diagnosis, treatment or evaluation 
where they can be connected with a particular patient. 
Id. at 414-415. (Emphasis added.) 
Likewise, in Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d 1358 
(Ind. 1992), the court ordered production of medical records for every patient on which 
the defendant doctor performed neck or back surgery over a three-year period. The court 
concluded: 
By placing safeguards on the release of information, the former patient's 
privacy expectations are satisfied. Therefore, we hold that where adequate 
safeguards exist to protect the identity and confidentiality of the non-party 
patient, the trial court may allow the discovery of the non-party patient 
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medical records even where the patient has not waived the physician-patient 
privilege. 
Id. at 13625. 
Consistent with these authorities, the trial court provided adequate safeguards to 
protect the non-party patients' privacy. Before coming to its conclusion, the trial court 
recognized that it needed to balance Plaintiffs need for the records against the privacy 
concerns of the patients. The trial court found that Plaintiffs need for the records was 
high because they are a key component to her case, and that the risk of identifying the 
patients through the redacted records was low because of the lack of identifying 
information in such a large community. 
The trial court also entered a strict protective order limiting review of the redacted 
medical records to attorneys and experts only, para-legals and support staff cannot even 
5See, also, Baptist Memorial Hospital-Union County v. Johnson, 754 So.2d 1165 
(Miss. 2000); State v. Schaeperkoetter, 933 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1996); Amente v. Newman, 
653 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 1995); Tanzi v. St. Joseph Hospital, 651 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1994); 
Community Hosp. Assoc, v. District Court, 570 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1977); Rudnickv. 
Superior Court, 523 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1974); State v. Randall, 431 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1968); 
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 206 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1965), rearg't den yd by, 
209 N.E.2d 126 (N.Y. 1965); Richards v. Kerlakian, 835 N.E.2d 768 (Oh. Ct. App. 
2005), stay den'd by, 836 N.E.2d 1226 (Ohio 2005), and app'I not allowed by, 841 
N.E.2d 320 (Ohio 2006); In re Whiteley, supra', Fischer Hartford Hospital, 2002 WL 
237409 (Conn. Super. 2002); Ziegler v. Superior Court, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982); Osterman v. Ehrenworth, 256 A.2d 123 (N.J. Super. 1969); Application of 
American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520 (2nd Cir. 1989); Cochran v. St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins., 909 F.Supp. 641 (W.D. Ark. 1995); and Bennett v. Fieser, supra. 
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review them; the records cannot be disclosed outside of this litigation; and the records 
must be returned at the conclusion of the litigation. 
Moreover, the trial court's order is consistent with this Court's prior decisions 
regarding non-party patient privacy. In Burns, supra, this Court recognized that a 
protective order may adequately protect non-party patients' privacy. There, the Attorney 
General's Office submitted an application to the district court to open an investigation 
into suspected fraudulent billing practices of a chiropractic clinic. The district court 
authorized the investigation and entered a secrecy order. Then, the State served the 
owner of the clinic, Dr. Bums, with a subpoena for all medical and billing records of over 
300 patients. The secrecy order did not require the medical records to be redacted, and 
Dr. Burns filed a motion to quash the subpoena. In discussing the secrecy order, this 
Court said: 
The district court, in particular, should not order a physician to disclose 
confidential medical records without first taking measures to protect the 
records from public disclosure. In this case, the district court entered a 
secrecy order to protect against public disclosure. 
In sum, we deny Burn's petition for extraordinary relief because Judge 
Boy den properly denied Burns's motion to quash the subpoenas. The State 
rebutted Burns's presumed authority to claim the physisican-patient 
privilege by showing that it was more likely than not that Bums claimed the 
privilege for his own benefit rather than on behalf of his patients. 
Moreover, there remains adequate protection from public disclosure of 
Burn's patient records. 
Id. at 380. (Emphasis added.) 
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As was the case in Burns, the trial court's order provides adequate protection from 
public disclosure of St. Marks's patients' records, given the restrictions discussed above. 
Further, the trial court's order requires that all identifying information be redacted from 
the medical records before disclosure, which arguably provides even more protection than 
what this Court found sufficient in Burns. Thus, the trial court provided adequate 
safeguards and correctly found that, "sufficient redaction and protection can remove the 
records from the privilege entirely." (R.1227) 
The cases cited by St. Marks for the opposite conclusion are either distinguishable 
or not persuasive. For example, Davis v. American Home Products, 727 So.2d 647 
(La.App. 1999), was based on Louisiana Code Section 13:3715.1(B)(5) which required 
notice to the patient and a hearing before third party medical records can be produced. 
Section 13:3715.1(B)(5) states: 
(5) A court shall issue an order for the production and disclosure of a 
patient's records regardless of whether the patient is a party to the litigation, 
only: after a contradictory hearing with the patient, or, if represented, with 
his counsel of record, or, if deceased, with those persons identified in 
Paragraph (3) hereof, and after a finding by the court that the release of the 
requested information is proper; or with consent of the patient. 
Id. at 649. 
The Davis court based its refusal to order production of third party records on the 
requesting party's failure to comply with Section 13:3715.1(B)(5): 
In this case, none of the non-party patients gave written authorizations. 
Further, the mandatory procedure set out in La. R.S. 13:3715.1(B)(5) was 
not followed. There was no contradictory hearing with the non-party 
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patients, their counsel, any of their survivors, or the executors or 
administrators of their estates. 
Id. at 650. The court also rejected the argument that redacting patient names remedied the 
failure to comply with Section 13:3715.1(B)(5) by stating that "there is no authority for 
the proposition that medical records become exempt from the mandatory requirements of 
La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1469.1 and La.Rev.Stat. 13:3715.1 by the redaction or removal of 
'patient information.' " Id. Therefore, the holding that third-party records were not 
discoverable was based solely a Louisiana statute which has no counter part in Utah. See 
also Baker v. OakwoodHosp. Corp,, 608 N.W.2d 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (based on 
statute that requires the patient to put her condition at issue). 
The reasoning of another case cited by St. Marks, Parkson v. Central DuPage 
Hosp., 435 N.E.2d 140 (111. App. 1982)6, has been rejected by other courts. For example, 
in Terre Haute, supra, the court considered and rejected the holding in Parkson on the 
grounds that redaction of any patient-identifying information and the entry of a protective 
order would protect the third party patients' right to confidentiality. Terre Haute 
RegionalHosp.f Inc., 600 N.E.2d at 1361-62 (Ind. 1992). See, also, Ziegler, 656 P.2d at 
1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) ("We are not impressed with Parkson v. Central Dupage 
Hospital supra, relied upon by the respondent hospital."). The better-reasoned authorities 
6The Court in Ekstrom v. Temple, 553 N.E.2d 424 (111. Ct. App. 1990) blindly 
followed the decision in Parkson. 
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have consistently held that production of redacted third-party records does not violate the 
physician-patient privilege. 
In both Unickv. Kessler Memorial Hosp., 257 A.2d 134 (N.J. Super. 1969); and 
Tuscon Med. Ctr. v. Rowles, 520 P.2d 518 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974), the requesting parties 
did not specifically seek redacted medical records. Moreover, appellate court cases in 
both of those jurisdictions have allowed discovery of redacted medical records. See 
Osterman, supra; and Ziegler, supra. 
Finally, Wozniakv. Kombrink, 1991 WL 17213 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Roe v. 
Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, 878 N.E.2d 1061 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); and 
Yoe v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 2003 WL 549923 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), are not 
persuasive for several reasons. First, Ohio recognizes that discovery of redacted non-
party patient records is permissible. See Richards, supra. Second, in Wozniak and Roe, 
the need for the records did not outweigh the risk presented by the disclosure. And, 
lastly, in both Roe and Yoe, the records were not necessary for the claims, unlike in this 
case. Accordingly, the Court should not be persuaded by any of the cases relied upon by 
St. Marks. 
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III. 
PLAINTIFF'S NEED FOR THE MEDICAL RECORDS OUTWEIGHS 
THE PRIVACY INTEREST OF THE NON-PARTY PATIENTS. 
St. Marks argues that Plaintiffs need for the medical records does not outweigh 
the interests of the non-party patients for three reasons: (1) Plaintiffs negligent-staffing 
claim is somehow unnecessary in light of Plaintiff s respondeat-superior claim;7 
(2) whether St. Marks was understaffed is allegedly irrelevant to Plaintiffs claims; and 
(3) St. Marks claims to have produced sufficient evidence on St. Marks's staffing 
conditions. Each of these arguments is without merit. 
A. Plaintiff is entitled to assert a separate claim for negligent 
staffing under Utah law. 
In Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), this Court made it 
clear that a plaintiff may simultaneously assert claims based on both respondeat superior 
and on the direct negligence of an employer. In that case, the defendant employee injured 
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff sued the employer on a theory of respondeat superior and 
for the employer's own negligence in supervising the employee. On appeal, this court 
said: 
Regardless of whether an employer can be held vicariously liable for its 
employee's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer 
may be directly liable for its own negligence in hiring or supervising 
employees. 
7St. Marks raised this argument for the first time in its petition to this court for permission 
to appeal an interlocutory order. The argument was not made to the trial court. 
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Id. at 1048. 
The Clover court made it very clear that, under Utah law, a plaintiff may assert two 
separate theories of liability against an employer. The Court did not distinguish between 
situations in which an employer admits that the employee was in the course and scope of 
employment, and situations in which an employer contests the employee's status. To the 
contrary, the Court concluded that a plaintiff may purse a direct-liability claim against an 
employer "regardless" of the employee's status. Therefore, Plaintiff may assert a 
negligent-staffing claim against St. Marks as well as a claim for vicarious liability. 
Utah's comparative-fault scheme8 requires that plaintiff be permitted to present 
claims against St. Marks for both vicarious liability and St. Mark's independent 
negligence in overloading Nurse Stallings with patients. St. Marks intends to include 
plaintiffs doctor, Dr. Jolles, on the verdict form and ask the jury to apportion fault to Dr. 
Jolles for any role he played in causing plaintiffs kidney damage. Fault means any act 
"causing or contributing to injury or damages." Field v. Boyer Co., L.C, 952 P.2d 1078, 
1080 (Utah 1998). 
8Under this statutory scheme, the trial court must allow the jury to apportion fault: 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, 
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to 
each person seeking recovery, to each St. Marks, to any person immune 
from suit, and to any other person identified under Subsection 78B-5-821(4) 
for whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault. 
U.C.A. §78B-5-819(l). 
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Plaintiff asserts that St. Marks was at fault for knowingly understaffing the 
hospital and overloading Nurse Stallings with patients, and that this fault is independent 
of its vicarious liability for the actions of Nurse Stallings. If St. Marks wants to compare 
its fault with that of Dr. Jolles, the jury must be permitted to here evidence concerning St. 
Mark's fault in understaffing the hospital. Otherwise, Dr. Jolles could be assigned an 
unjustly high percentage of fault, because the jury did not hear evidence concerning all of 
the actions by St. Marks which caused or contributed to plaintiffs injury. 
Plaintiff may also assert an understaffing claim because plaintiff seeks punitive 
damages against St. Marks based on its knowing and reckless failure to staff the hospital 
with sufficient nurses. This claim requires Plaintiff to prove facts in addition to the facts 
needed to prove her respondeat superior claim. Plaintiffs respondeat superior claim is 
based on Nurse Stalling's negligence in failing to notify Dr. Jolles of Plaintiff s 
symptoms of renal failure, and failing to take actions in response to Plaintiffs symptoms 
of renal failure. However, her understaffing claim is based on St. Mark's knowing failure 
to employ adequate nursing staff to provide competent and safe patient care. The non-
party medical records are directly relevant to plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, and 
St. Marks has not cited any authority suggesting that a claim for punitive damages against 
an employer cannot be brought simultaneously with a claim for respondeat superior. 
All of the cases cited by St. Marks on this issue are distinguishable. St. Marks 
primarily relies on Thompson v. Northeast III Reg. Commuter R.R. Corp., 854 N.E.2d 
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744 (111 Ct. App. 2006),9 for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot pursue a direct-liability 
claim when the defendant admits that the employee was in the course and scope of his 
employment. The court in Thompson, however, did not consider Utah's comparative-
fault statutes, and the case did not involve the issue of apportioning fault among multiple 
defendants. There were also no claims for punitive damages. Most importantly, the 
decision in Thompson directly conflicts with this Court's statement of Utah law in Clover, 
Therefore, the Court should not be persuaded by St. Marks's cases and should find that 
Plaintiffs negligent-staffing claim is permissible under Utah law. 
B. The requested records are highly relevant to Plaintiffs claims, 
St. Marks argues that the medical records are not relevant to Plaintiffs claims that 
Nurse Stallings was negligent because St. Marks "has not claimed that Nurse Stallings 
was prevented from attending to Plaintiff because she was too busy with other patients 
who were in more serious condition." {See Brief of Appellant, pg. 18.) St. Marks's 
argument misses the point because plaintiff asserts that (1) Nurse Stallings failed to 
comply with the standard of care, (2) because she was assigned more patients than she 
9St. Marks also cited the Court to Garland Comm. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541 
(Tex. 2004); Taylor v. Cabell Hungtington Hosp., Inc., 538 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 2000); 
Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697 (111. Ct. App. 2007); Benedict 
v. St. Luke's Hospitals, 365 N.W.2d 499 (N.D. 1985); Beavis ex. rel Beavis v. Campbell 
County Mem. Hosp., 20 P.3d 508 (Wyo. 2001); and Humana Med. Corp. of Ala. v. 
Traffanstedt, 597 So.2d 667 (Ala. 1992). None of these cases held that a plaintiff cannot 
pursue a respondeat-superior claim and a direct-liability claim. Further, all of the cases 
are distinguishable for the same reasons that Thompson is distinguishable. 
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could reasonably care for simultaneously, (3) which was the result of the hospital being 
understaffed. 
As discussed above, Plaintiff alleged that Nurse Stallings was negligent, in part, 
for failing to timely notify Dr. Jolles of Plaintiff s symptoms of renal failure and her 
failing to take timely actions in response to Plaintiffs symptoms of renal failure. One of 
the causes of Nurse Stalling's failures is the fact that she was assigned too many patients 
and could not take adequate care of Plaintiff. Therefore, the medical records on Nurse 
Stallings patients have independent causal relevance to Plaintiffs claims, and Plaintiff 
must be allowed to explain to the jury the reasons why Nurse Stallings failed to meet the 
standard of care. 
C. The requested medical records are the only evidence of patient-
acuity, and patient acuity is necessary to prove that St. Marks 
was understaffed. 
St. Marks argues that Plaintiff does not need the requested records because St. 
Marks has already produced records relating to the staffing conditions on 4 West. St. 
Marks produced only two pages that relate to staffing on the night in question. (R. 1028, 
1039) The documents produced by St. Mark's simply show the number of patients and 
the nurses to whom they were assigned. The documents produced by St. Mark contain no 
information concerning the condition or acuity of the patients assigned to Nurse Stallings 
on the night in question. St. Mark's staffing supervisor and its retained expert readily 
admitted that it is not possible to evaluate whether Nurse Stallings' patient load on the 
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night in question was too heavy without information concerning the condition of each of 
her patients. St. Marks has produced no evidence whatsoever concerning the condition or 
acuity of Nurse Stallings' patients. The medical records are the only evidence of patient 
condition and acuity that will permit analysis of whether Nurse Stallings had too many 
patients. Refusal to compel production of these records will essentially prohibit plaintiff 
from proving her understaffing claim. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter an order 
AFFIRMING the trial court's order. 
DATED this Is* day of December, 2008. 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
David A. Cutt 
Jordan P. Kendell 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
Plaintiff has attached an annotated version of Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _] day of December, 2008, copies of the foregoing 
were mailed via U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid to the following: 
Eric Schoonveld 
Mark Riekhof 
HALL, PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD 
136 E. South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Westlaw, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
Article V. Privileges 
RULE 506. PHYSICIAN AND MENTAL HEALTH THERAPIST-PATIENT 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a physician or mental health ther-
apist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed, to practice 
medicine in any state. 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or 
certified in any state as a physician, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family ther-
apist, advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, 
or professional counselor while that person is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional 
condition, including alcohol or drug addiction. 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of dia-
gnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to pre-
vent any other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician 
or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information transmit-
ted among a patient, a physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or 
treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians or members of the 
patient's family who are present to further the interest of the patient because they are reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of the communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the 
physician or mental health therapist. 
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator 
of the patient. The person who was the physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is 
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, 
mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any 
claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for Mental Illness. For communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize 
the patient for mental illness, if the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determ-
ined that the patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court Ordered Examination. For communications made in the course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a 
court-ordered examination of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or wit-
ness, unless the court in ordering the examination specifies otherwise. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective July 1, 1994.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 506 is modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and is intended to supersede Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-24-8(4) and 58-25a-8. There is no corresponding federal rule. By virtue of Rule 501, marriage and 
family therapists are not covered by this Rule. 
The differences between existing § 78-24-8 and Rule 506 are as follows: 
(1) Rule 506 specifically applies to psychotherapists and licensed psychologists, it being the opinion of the 
Committee that full disclosure of information by a patient in those settings is as critical as and as much to be en-
couraged as in the "physician" patient setting. The Utah Supreme Court requested that Rule 506 further apply to 
licensed clinical social workers. To meet this request, the Committee included such individuals within the defin-
ition of psychotherapists. Under Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-2(5), the practice of clinical social work "means the 
application of an established body of knowledge and professional skills in the practice of psychotherapy...." 
Section 58-35-6 provides that "[n]o person may engage in the practice of clinical social work unless that person: 
(1) is licensed under this chapter as a certified social worker," has the requisite experience, and has passed an 
examination. Section 58-35-8(4) refers to licenses and certificates for "clinical social worker[s]." As a result of 
including clinical social workers, Rule 506 is intended to supplant Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-10 in total for all so-
cial workers. 
(2) Rule 506 applies to both civil and criminal cases, whereas § 78-24-8 applies only to civil cases. The Com-
mittee was of the opinion that the considerations supporting the privilege apply in both. 
(3) In the Committee's original recommendation to the Utah Supreme Court, the proposed Rule 506 granted pro-
tection only to confidential communications, but did not extend the privilege to observations made, diagnosis or 
treatment by the physician/psychotherapist. The Committee was of the opinion that while the traditional protec-
tion of the privilege should extend to confidential communications, as is the case in other traditional privileges, 
the interests of society in discovering the truth during the trial process outweigh any countervailing interests in 
extending the protection to observations made, diagnosis or treatment. However, the Supreme Court requested 
that the scope of the privilege be broadened to include information obtained by the physician or psychotherapist 
in the course of diagnosis or treatment, whether obtained verbally from the patient or through the physician's or 
psychotherapist's observation or examination of the patient. The Court further requested that the privilege extend 
to diagnosis, treatment, and advice. To meet these requests, the Committee relied in part on language from the 
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California evidentiary privileges involving physicians and psychotherapists. See Cai.Evid.Code §§ 992 and 
1012. These features of the rule appear in subparagraphs (a)(4) and (b). The Committee also relied on language 
from Uniform Rule of Evidence 503. 
Upon the death of the patient, the privilege ceases to exist. 
The privilege extends to communications to the physician or psychotherapist from other persons who are acting 
in the interest of the patient, such as family members or others who may be consulted for information needed to 
help the patient. 
The privilege includes those who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the phys-
ician or psychotherapist. For example, a certified social worker practicing under the supervision of a clinical so-
cial worker would be included. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-6. 
The patient is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communication, but also to prevent disclos-
ure by the physician or psychotherapist or others who were properly involved or others who overheard, without 
the knowledge of the patient, the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with by Rule 507. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically enumerated, and further endorsed the 
concept that in the area of exceptions, the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than express-
ing the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any possible clashes 
with the common law concepts of "waiver." 
The Committee did not intend this rule to limit or conflict with the health care data statutes listed in the Com-
mittee Note to Rule 501. 
Rule 506 is not intended to override the child abuse reporting requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. § 
62A-4-501 etseq. 
The 1994 amendment to Rule 506 was primarily in response to legislation enacted during the 1994 Legislative 
General Session that changed the licensure requirements for certain mental health professionals. The rule now 
covers communications with additional licensed professionals who are engaged in treatment and diagnosis of 
mental or emotional conditions, specifically certified social workers, marriage and family therapists, specially 
designated advanced practice registered nurses and professional counselors. 
Some mental health therapists use the term "client" rather than "patient," but for simplicity this rule uses only 
"patient." 
The committee also combined the definition of confidential communication and the general rule section, but no 
particular substantive change was intended by the reorganization. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Mental Health Professional Practice Act, privilege, see §§ 58-60-113 and 58-60-114. 
Minors, exemption of certain examinations, see § 78-3a-109. 
Psychologists, see §§ 58-61-601 and 58-61-602. 
Substance abuse counselors, see §§ 58-60-509 and 58-60-510. 
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Doctor-patient privilege, 
Psychotherapist-patient privilege, witness privileges, confidential communications between psychotherapist 
and patient, see Jaffee v. Redmond, U.S.I1L 1996, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 518 U.S. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 337. 
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1. In general 
No doctor-patient privilege warranted suppression of defendant's statements, made while defendant was being 
treated at a hospital, to agents of Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). U.S. v. Trejo-Islas, 2002, 248 
F.Supp.2d 1072. Witnesses €^> 208(1) 
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The physician-patient evidentiary privilege is unknown to the common law, and does not exist in federal stat-
utes. U.S. v. Trejo-Islas, 2002, 248 F.Supp.2d 1072. Witnesses € ^ > 208(1) 
A physician's duty of confidentiality is different and distinct from the physician-patient testimonial privilege; the 
privilege governs the dissemination of information as part of a court proceeding, while the duty of confidential-
ity is not similarly restricted, and serves a broader purpose, which arises from the understanding that good med-
ical care requires a patient's trust and confidence that disclosures to physicians will be used solely for the pa-
tient's welfare and that a patient's privacy with regard to those disclosures will be respected and protected. 
Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008, 177 P.3d 614, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 2008 UT 8. Witnesses € ^ > 208(1) 
As part of therapeutic relationship, doctor or therapist has obligation to protect confidentiality of his patients 
that transcends any duty he has as citizen to voluntarily provide information that might be relevant in pending 
litigation. Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006, 143 P.3d 295, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2006 UT App 340, certiorari gran-
ted 150 P.3d 544, decision affirmed and remanded 177 P.3d 614, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 2008 UT 8. Witnesses 
€ ^ > 214.5 
The physician-patient privilege is not absolute; the privilege rule contains explicit exceptions where the patient's 
condition is an element of a claim or defense, where the proceeding regards whether hospitalization for mental 
illness is necessary, and where an examination is ordered by a court, and other statutes require physicians to dis-
close otherwise-privileged information to law enforcement officials in instances where there is suspected child 
abuse, or a weapon-related injury. Burns v. Boyden, 2006, 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 UT 14. 
Witnesses € ^ > 208(1) 
The physician-patient privilege serves to alleviate patients' fear that their medical records could be disclosed to 
the public and cause them embarrassment. Bums v. Boyden, 2006, 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 
UT 14. Witnesses € ^ > 208(1) 
Where defendant is aware of specific information contained in a file of generally privileged records, he is free to 
request it directly from the court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Rules of Evid., Rule 506(d)(1); 
U.C.A.1953, 58-60-114(2)(b). State v. Cardall, 1999, 982 P.2d 79, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 1999 UT 51. Criminal 
Law C^> 627.5(6) 
Therapist-patient privilege is not absolute. Rules of Evid., Rule 506(d)(1); U.C.A.1953. 58-60-114(2)(b). State 
v. Cardall, 1999, 982 P.2d 79, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 1999 UT 51. Witnesses €=> 214.5 
Physician may testify as to fact of employment by patient, that he treated or attended patient, that he performed 
operation on patient, number of visits, dates thereof, place of attendance, duration of treatment, and when treat-
ment ceased, and similar facts. Rev.St.1933, 104-49-3. Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 89 Utah 273, 
57 P.2d 362. Witnesses € ^ > 208(1) 
At common law communications between a physician and patient were not privileged. In re Young's Estate, 
1908, 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731, 126 Am.St.Rep. 843, 14 Am.Ann.Cas. 596. Witnesses € ^ > 208(1 f 
1.5. Purpose 
The purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to promote full disclosure within a physician-patient relation-
ship and thereby facilitate more effective treatment. Burns v. Boyden, 2006, 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 
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44, 2006 V I 14. Witnesses € ^ > 208(1) 
1.7. Persons entitled to claim privilege, generally 
A patient, the guardian and the conservator have unequivocal rights to claim the physician-patient privilege. 
Burns v. Boyden, 2006, 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 UT 14. Witnesses € ^ > 217 
Although there is no blanket exception to the physician-patient privilege for suspected insurance fraud, evidence 
of such fraud has bearing on a physician's presumed authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. 
Burns v. Boyden, 2006, 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 UT 14. Witnesses €^> 208(2) 
2. Patient 
Defendant in prosecution for aggravated sexual abuse of a child established that alleged victim's mental health 
records existed and that there was reasonable certainty that the records actually contained exculpatory evidence 
favorable to his defense that victim had motive to lie about the abuse allegations, such that defendant was en-
titled to in camera review of the records under exception to physician-patient privilege; defendant provided cal-
endar documenting victim's therapy dates, victim's mother was present for at least one of the therapy sessions at 
which victim described her animosity toward mother, and victim's journal entries described her animosity to-
ward her parents. State v. Worthen, 2008, 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2008 UT App 23, certiorari 
granted 189 P.3d 1276. Witnesses € ^ > 214.5 
Determining whether a person is a "patient," and thus entitled to assert the physician-patient privilege, does not 
turn on whether the person voluntarily consulted a physician; instead, the controlling fact in such a determina-
tion is whether the encounter is for the purposes of treatment. Rules of Evid., Rule 506(c). Debry v. Goates, 
2000, 999 P.2d 582, 360 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 2000 UT App 58, certiorari denied 9 P.3d 170. Witnesses € ^ > 209 
Where a physician was sent to make an examination of a passenger injured by a street railroad company, it will 
be presumed that the relation of physician and patient existed with regard to such examination, and that the in-
formation obtained was for the purpose of enabling the physician to prescribe and act for the patient. Munz v. 
Salt Lake City R. Co., 1902, 25 Utah 220. 70 P. 852. Witnesses € ^ > 209 
3. Narcotics records 
Physician's patient records to extent they contained narcotics records required to be kept by him were not priv-
ileged under Utah statute concerning physician-patient privilege. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4; U.C.A.1953, 
58-!3a-21, 58-13a-25, 78-24-8(4). Anderson v. Reynolds, 1972. 342 F.Supp. 101, affirmed476 F.2d 665. Wit-
nesses €^> 204(2) 
4. Life insurance 
In action on industrial life policies, physicians who had treated insured could testify to information acquired 
while treating insured, provided testimony did not include information acquired in attending insured which was 
necessary to enable them to treat or act for her. Rev.St. 1933, 104-49-3. Hklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
1936. 89 Ltah 273, 57 P.2d 362. Witnesses € ^ > 212 
In action on industrial life policies, evidence of physician that insured was his patient, that he treated her at 
times and places indicated, and of other physicians that insured had been examined and X-rays taken and that in-
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sured was treated at hospital held admissible on issue whether policies had been obtained by insured's fraudulent 
representations as to physical condition. Rev.St.1933, 104-49-3. Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1936, 89 
Utah 273, 57 P.2d 362. Witnesses € ^ > 208(1) 
4.5. Insurance fraud 
Insurance Fraud Act does not create a statutory exception to the physician-patient privilege in cases where there 
is suspected insurance fraud; though the Act requires an insurer to release to an authorized agency information 
or evidence that is relevant to any suspected insurance fraud, Act did not impose on physicians any direct duty 
to release privileged information. Burns v. Boydcn, 2006. 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 UT 14. 
Witnesses € ^ > 208(2) 
5. Fraud in obtaining controlled substances 
Exception to physician-patient privilege applied to defendant arrested for fraudulently obtaining controlled sub-
stances by prescription so as to permit physicians to testify at trial that they each had prescribed controlled sub-
stances for defendant unaware that defendant was receiving similar narcotics from other physicians; defendant's 
underlying purpose in consulting physicians was to illegally obtain drugs, and defendant failed to disclose to 
physicians all relevant information necessary for effective treatment. Rules of Evid., Rule 506(b); U.C.A.1953, 
58-37-6. State v. Anderson, 1998, 972 P.2d 86. 359 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. Witnesses € ^ > 211(4) 
6. Use of anesthetic 
Where physicians made a physical examination of an injured person whom they put under the influence of an 
anesthetic to obtain information to enable them to treat his injury, information obtained thereby was a privileged 
communication. Madsen v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., 1909, 36 Utah 528, 105 P. 799. Witnesses €^> 212 
7. Waiver 
Even if statute governing physician-patient privilege applied so as to prevent physicians from testifying that de-
fendant fraudulently received prescribed controlled substances from them, defendant waived privilege by failing 
to object to the physicians' testimony at preliminary hearing and could not reassert it at trial. State v. Anderson, 
1998, 972 P.2d 86, 359 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. Witnesses € ^ > 219(5) 
A patient cannot testify concerning what was said and done by his physician in the treatment of the injuries 
which are the subject of the litigation and then close the physician's mouth by claiming privilege. Utah Code 
1943, 104-49-3, subd. 4. Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 1945, 108 Utah 577, 162 P.2d 759. Witnesses € ^ > 219(5) 
In personal injury action, where plaintiff testified concerning the nature and extent of his injuries, but did not 
testify concerning anything which his physicians told him, nor did he give details concerning the mode of treat-
ment, plaintiff did not waive privilege of statute prohibiting physician from testifying without patient's consent. 
Utah Code 1943, 104-49-3, subd. 4. Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 1945, 108 Utah 577, 162 P.2d 759. Wit-
nesses C=> 219(5) 
In action on double indemnity provision of life policy excepting death from disease, exclusion of testimony of 
insured's physician that insured had been suffering from an ailment up to day of his death was error, notwith-
standing insurer had not pleaded that disease was direct cause of accident resulting in insured's death, where in-
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sured's waiver of statutory provision forbidding his physician from disclosing information acquired was very 
broad. Utah Code 1943, 104-49-3(4). Massing v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.. 1945, 108 Utah 198, 159 P.2d 
117. Insurance € ^ > 3571; Witnesses €^> 219(6) 
Plaintiff, who testified as to a physician's treatment of and statements to him as to the nature of his injury, 
waived the physician's privilege under Comp. Laws 1907, § 3414, subd. 4, as amended by Laws 1911, c. 109. 
Dahlquist v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 1918, 52 Utah 438, 174 P. 833. Witnesses € ^ > 219(5) 
8. Presumptions and burden of proof 
The fact that the victim's medical and mental health records were possibly cumulative of other non-privileged 
evidence available to defendant to support his theory that the victim fabricated the charges did not render the re-
cords immaterial, as argued by the State, and thus did not preclude in camera review of the records under an ex-
ception to the privilege for physician and mental health therapist records; in order to obtain in camera review of 
privileged communications a defendant had to show, with reasonable certainty, that the records contained ex-
culpatory evidence that would be favorable to the defense, and the issue of materiality was for the court when 
reviewing the records. State v. Worthen, 2007, 591 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2007 UT App 370, 2007 WL 3407322, 
superseded 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2008 UT App 23, certiorari granted 189 P.3d 1276. Criminal 
Law €=^> 627.8(4) 
Fact that the alleged victim's mental health records were possibly cumulative of other non-privileged evidence 
available to defendant to support his theory that the victim fabricated the sexual abuse charges did not render the 
records immaterial, as argued by the State, and thus did not preclude in camera review of the records under an 
exception to the privilege for physician and mental health therapist records; in order to obtain in camera review 
of privileged communications a defendant had to show, with reasonable certainty, that the records contained ex-
culpatory evidence that would be favorable to the defense, and the issue of materiality was for the court when 
reviewing the records. State v. Worthen, 2008, 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2008 UT App 23, certiorari 
granted 189 P.3d 1276. Criminal Law € ^ > 627.8(4) 
Defendant did not show with reasonable certainty that child victim's medical records from two hospitals con-
tained exculpatory evidence, and thus defendant was not entitled to m camera review of medical records in pro-
secution for aggravated sexual abuse of a child, even though defendant argued that medical records would reveal 
that victim was unstable at trial and was therefore unable to testify truthfully; defendant told trial court that he 
could point to nothing specific to show that victim had previously had a mental-health problem, and victim re-
counted defendant's abuse consistently, several times before and at trial. State v. Wengreen, 2007, 167 P.3d 516, 
583 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2007 UT App 264, certiorari denied 186 P.3d 957. Criminal Law € ^ > 627.8(4) 
Juvenile, who was ordered to pay restitution in amount of $2486.24, which was one-half of the cost of minor's 
stay at treatment center for troubled teens, following an adjudication for unlawful sexual activity with a minor, 
failed to establish a reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence existed in minor's counseling records that 
would be favorable to his defense, as would entitle him to in camera review of such records; although juvenile 
argued that minor's records and communications with counselor would establish that her second stay at treat-
ment center was not directly related to juvenile's sexual offense, juvenile never identified any specific post-
offense counseling sessions, supported by extrinsic evidence, that were directly related to minor's previous stay 
at treatment center. State ex rel. T.W., 2006, 139 P.3d 312, 554 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2006 UT App 259. 
State showed that it was more likely than not that chiropractor was invoking the physician-patient privilege in 
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his own self-interest, and thus rebutted presumption that chiropractor had authority to claim the physician-pa-
tient privilege on his patients' behalf, in criminal investigation of chiropractor's billing practices under the Sub-
poena Powers Act, where the only person who stood to benefit from quashing subpoena asking for chiropractor's 
billing records by asserting the privilege was the chiropractor, as there was a secrecy order in place that preven-
ted public disclosure, and chiropractor during the proceeding in fact had consistently attacked the secrecy order. 
Burns v. Boyden, 2006, 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 UT 14. Witnesses € ^ > 217 
To defeat a physician's ability to claim the physician-patient privilege once the physician has proven all the ba-
sic facts, a party needs to prove that the nonexistence of a physician's intent to claim the privilege for the pa-
tient's benefit is more probable than its existence, or, in other words, that it is more likely than not that the phys-
ician is claiming the privilege in his own self-interest. Burns v. Boyden, 2006, 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 44, 2006 UT 14. Witnesses €^> 217 
To trigger the presumption that a physician can invoke the physician-patient privilege on behalf of a patient, a 
treating physician must prove that the information at issue was (1) communicated in confidence; (2) to or from a 
physician or mental health therapist; and (3) for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient. Burns v. Boy-
den, 2006, 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 UT 14. Witnesses € ^ > 217 
A treating physician has presumptive authority to claim the physician-patient privilege, not absolute authority, 
and the presumption is rebuttable. Burns v. Boyden, 2006. 133 P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep, 44, 2006 UT 14. 
Witnesses € ^ > 217 
9. Exception to privilege 
Defendant in prosecution for aggravated sexual abuse of a child was entitled to in camera review of the victim's 
therapy records to determine if they were material to defendant's defense; if the records documented the victim's 
animosity toward defendant and her mother and her desire to be removed from the home, the evidence would be 
favorable to defendant's theory that the victim fabricated the allegations. State v. Worthen, 2007, 591 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10, 2007 UT App 370, 2007 WL 3407322, superseded 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2008 UT App 
23, certiorari granted 189 P.3d 1276. Criminal Law € ^ > 627.8(4) 
The victim's medical records from psychiatric institute supported an element of defendant's defense to aggrav-
ated sexual abuse of a child, and thus the records were not privileged and were subject to in camera review, un-
der the exception to the general rule of privilege for physicians, mental health providers and patients if the pa-
tient's "physical, mental, or emotional condition" is relevant "in any proceeding in which any party relies upon 
the condition as an element of [a] claim or defense"; defendant's defense was that he did not commit the charged 
crime and that the victim, his adopted daughter, hated her parents and made up the allegations so she would be 
placed in another home, and the records would have supported defendant's defense and interjected doubt as to 
whether he committed the crime. State v. Worthen, 2007, 591 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2007 UT App 370, 2007 WL 
3407322, superseded 177 P.3d 664, 596 Ltah Adv. Rep. 3, 2008 UT App 23, certiorari granted 189 P.3d 1276. 
Witnesses €^> 223 
The trial court adequately addressed whether defendant's request for in camera review of the alleged victim's 
mental health records fell within an exception to the privilege for physician and mental health therapist records 
before addressing the reasonable certainty test; the court first stated that the records defendant sought were gen-
erally privileged, it noted the exception for a condition that was an element of a claim or defense, it explained 
the exception, and then it concluded that defendant had satisfied the elements of the reasonable certainty test. 
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State v. Worthen, 2007, 591 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2007 UT App 370, 2007 WL 3407322, superseded 177 P.3d 
664, 596 Utah Ad^. Rep. 3. 2008 UT App 23, certiorari granted 189 P.3d 1276. Criminal I aw € ^ > 627.8(4) 
Alleged victim's medical records from psychiatric institute supported an element of defendant's defense to ag-
gravated sexual abuse of a child, and thus the records were not privileged and were subject to in camera review, 
under the exception to the general rule of privilege for physicians, mental health providers and patients if the pa-
tient's "physical, mental, or emotional condition" is relevant "in any proceeding in which any party relies upon 
the condition as an element of [a] claim or defense"; defendant's defense was that he did not commit the charged 
crime and that the victim, his adopted daughter, hated her parents and made up the allegations so she would be 
placed in another home, and the records would have supported defendant's defense and interjected doubt as to 
whether he committed the crime. State v. Worthen, 2008. 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2008 UT App 
23, certiorari granted 189 P.3d 1276. Witnesses € ^ > 223 
Trial court adequately addressed, in prosecution for aggravated sexual abuse of child, whether defendant's re-
quest for in camera review of the alleged victim's mental health records fell within an exception to the privilege 
for physician and mental health therapist records before addressing the reasonable certainty test; the court first 
stated that the records defendant sought were generally privileged, it noted the exception for a condition that was 
an element of a claim or defense, it explained the exception, and then it concluded that defendant had satisfied 
the elements of the reasonable certainty test. State v. Worthen, 2008, 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2008 
UT App 23, certiorari granted 189 P.3d 1276. Criminal Law €^ 627.8(4) 
Exception, to physician-patient privilege, for a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or 
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or de-
fense, does not vitiate the entirety of the physician's duty of confidentiality; such duty remains intact in litigation 
and continues to prevent a physician from disclosing confidential information to a patient's friends, family, em-
ployers, or any other third party. Sorensen v. Barbulo, 2008, 177 P.3d 614, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 2008 UT 8. 
Witnesses €==> 219(5) 
Exception, to physician-patient privilege, for a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or 
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or de-
fense, is confined to court proceedings, and is restricted to the treatment related to the condition at issue. 
Sorensen v. Barbuto. 2008, 177 P.3d 614, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 49. 2008 UT 8. Witnesses €^> 219(5) 
Because physician's acts of communicating ex parte with defense counsel in former patient's personal injury ac-
tion against alleged tortfeasor, and agreeing to be expert witness for defense, were not legally justified, judicial 
proceeding privilege did not apply to protect physician from former patient's claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006, 143 P.3d 295. 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2006 UT App 340, certior-
ari granted 150 P.3d 544, decision affirmed and remanded 177 P.3d 614, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 49. 2008 UT 8. 
Damages C^> 57.49 
Exception to physician-patient privilege applicable when patient's condition is element of claim or defense is not 
without limits. Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006, 143 P.3d 295. 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 18. 2006 UT App 340, certiorari 
granted 150 P.3d 544, decision affirmed and remanded 177 P.3d 614, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 49. 2008 UT 8. Wit-
nesses €=> 219(4.1) 
The physician-patient privilege applies to a criminal investigation under the Subpoena Powers Act, though it is 
subject to recognized exceptions and the rebuttable presumption that the physician can invoke the privilege, as a 
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privilege applies regardless of the stage of a proceedmg, and though, there are a number of contexts where most 
of the rules of evidence do not apply, such is not the case in regard to privileges. Burns v. Boyden, 2006, 133 
P.3d 370, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006 UT 14. Witnesses € ^ > 208(2) 
10. Reasonable certainty test 
Under the reasonable certainty test, for in camera inspection of privileged records, defendant must establish first 
that the counseling records exist and second, reasonable certainty that the sought-after records actually contain 
exculpatory evidence which would be favorable to his defense. State v. Worthen, 2007, 591 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 
2007 UT App 370, 2007 WL 3407322, superseded 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 2008 UT App 23, certi-
orari granted 189 P.3d 1276. Criminal Law € ^ > 627.8(4) 
Under the reasonable certainty test for in camera inspection of medical records that support an element of a 
claim or defense, defendant must establish first that the records exist and second, reasonable certainty that the 
sought-after records actually contain exculpatory evidence which would be favorable to his defense. State v. 
Worthen, 2008. 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2008 UT App 23, certiorari granted 189 P.3d 1276. Wit-
nesses C^> 212 
11. Limitations of review of records 
In granting defendant's motion for in camera inspection of alleged victim's mental health records in prosecution 
for aggravated sexual abuse of a child, trial judge was to personally review the records, rather than have his law 
clerk review the records and highlight the relevant information before presenting the records to the judge for in 
camera review, given the sensitive nature of the records and the need to limit the number of people allowed to 
review the confidential records. State v. Worthen. 2008, 177 P.3d 664, 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 2008 UT App 23, 
certiorari granted 189 P.3d 1276. Witnesses €^> 214.5 
12. Notice 
Even if communications between physician and patient may fall into the exception, to physician-patient priv-
ilege, for a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in 
any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, the patient has the right, under the 
health-care fiduciary duty of confidentiality, to be notified by the physician of the potential disclosure of confid-
ential records. Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008, 177 P.3d 614. 596 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 2008 UT 8. Health € ^ > 578 
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